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Book Reviews
THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. By F. Raymond Marks,t with Kirk Leswingtt and

BarbaraA. Fortinsky.tt Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1972. Pp. xii, 305. $7.95.
This is the era of public service-or a reasonable facsimile thereof.
Steel companies are "involved," lending institutions are "doing a lot
for America," and automobile manufacturers are planting trees. In this
milieu of self-proclaimed dedication to the common good (and, presumably, a concomitant repudiation of commercialism), it is not inappropriate that some large law firms in major metropolitan areas have
adopted the trappings of public service. During the past decade, they
have designated public interest partners and committees, set up branch
offices in the ghettos, become consultants to activist groups, and approved released-time for pro bono work.
The Lawyer, the Public, and Professional Responsibility is the product of a study by the American Bar Foundation of these mechanisms and
procedures developed by the private bar to accommodate the legal
needs of non-fee-paying clients. The study draws principally upon interviews with practicing attorneys who have worked, directly or through
their firms, in "public interest law."
The fundamental thesis of the study may be summarized as follows:
The legal profession has traditionally operated on a "price demand"
basis, i.e., legal services have been allocated to those who are able to
pay. Beginning in the 1960's, many "establishment" firms have departed
somewhat from this pattern through a variety of formal arrangements
which commit the firm and its members to some activity on behalf of
what is deemed to be the public good. However, despite these new
forms, there has been no substantial change in the fact that private
practice is dominated by corporate clients and corporate interests:
Our general impression is that the way in which large firms
practice remains substantially the same after they have adopted
t Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation; Professional Lecturer in the Graduate
School of Business and the School of Social Service Administration of the University of
Chicago; and former Staff Counsel and member of the Board, American Civil Liberties
Union, Illinois Division.
- - Research Associate, American Bar Foundation.
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public interest forms. For the most part public interest responses
are mere diversions for their firms-they remain ancillary to the
practice of law. Public interest work then, though explicitly directed, continues to look like a dispensation of grace rather than a
discharge of professional duty. The ways in which those law firms
make their money, relate to their regular clients, and practice law
limit---or threaten to limit-a fully integrated public interest
response.1
The authors argue that lawyers, if they are to be professionals rather
than just tradesmen, must respond to social needs. In the concluding
chapters, they outline alternatives for making practitioners more aware
of and responsive to the legal needs of the disadvantaged, the oppressed,
and the public at large. Particularly noteworthy are the analogy of the
practice of law to a public utility, and the recommendation that the
obligation to make legal services available be imposed upon each in2
dividual lawyer, rather than simply upon the profession.
While its commentary is interesting, the study is seriously deficient
when viewed as an argument for change. To begin with, the term
"public interest law" is never defined. Instead, the authors proceed on
the assumption that "public interest" law is whatever each practitionerinterviewee believes it to be. While such subjectivity might suffice for
an attitudinal survey, it precludes, a fortiori, any objective analyses
of the alleged problem and the proffered solutions. One may, perhaps,
infer that the authors intend public interest law to include all legal
services rendered outside the scope of a firm's regular billing system.
But such an expansive description would fail to distinguish between,
for example, an indigent accused and an affluent ecology club. The
needs of the "public interest" sector are diverse, and the ways in
which the legal profession ought to respond to these demands is not
necessarily the same in all instances. In the mid-1960's, public interest
law was almost synonymous with representation of the poor.3 Since
that time there has been greater emphasis on the need to serve the nonindigent lower middle-class. 4 Many authorities, such as Ralph Nader
and John W. Gardner, identify the public interest with reform in broad
1.
2.

F. MARKS, THE LAwYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy 252 (1972).
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS No. 2 states:

A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel
available.
3. A classic work on neighborhood legal services is Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty:
A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
4. See, e.g., Cheatham, Professional Privilege Brings Professional Responsibility, 58
A.B.A.J. 805 (1972).
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areas of the nation's political, economic, and social life. The point is
that recent literature has so expanded the concept of the "public interest" that its meaning is not self-evident. Moreover, no effort is made to
apprise the reader of the magnitude of the need. The absence of an
explanation of what public interest law is and how much it is needed,
renders hollow the conclusion that the bar's present response is inadequate.
Second, the scope of inquiry is limited to a small number of large
firms in a handful of large cities. It is doubtful that such a select, homogeneous sample is a valid basis for conclusions and recommendations
purporting to have universal applicability throughout the profession.
Third, while the phenomenon of the public interest law firm is
discussed and evaluated, no similar analysis is made of the impact of
government-related legal programs. Obviously, OEO legal services,
VISTA lawyers, and public defender offices have to some extent met
the need for the practice of law in the public interest. An evaluation of
the accomplishments and shortcomings of these and other public programs is a prerequisite to any meaningful discussion of what and how
much the private bar can or should do.
The book is worth reading because it is topical and well-written, its
conclusions are probably correct, and its discussion is thought-provoking. It should serve to reinforce the beliefs of those who are already convinced of the need for greater professional response to public interest
causes. But because it fails to meet its burden of proof, it is unlikely to
sway the undecided.
Robert S. Barker*

THE NOMINALISTIC PRINCIPLE. By Eliyahu Hirschberg.t

Jerusalem: Daf-Chen Printing Press, 1971. Pp. 138.
Eliyahu Hirschberg deals with one major problem in this essay: the
injustice to creditors (including insurance policy recipients, pensioners,
and investors) of being forced by law to accept the nominal' money
value of any loan or investment as full payment of the loan or invest*

Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.

t M.J. (Jerusalem); M. Phil. (London); attorney in private practice, specializing in
commercial law, in Jerusalem, Israel.
1. Hence "nominalism."
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ment, despite possibly drastic reductions in the purchasing power
(real value) of that nominal quantity of money. He is concerned with
the fact that people who contract to receive a specific sum of money
may, because of inflation, actually get something that is quite different
from what they expected. He traces the historical and legal bases for
that problem, and discusses three possible solutions: (1) Develop a
custom whereby all or most contracts include a price-index provision
(for example, cost-of-living clauses in labor agreements); 2 (2) When
inflation becomes especially bad, revalue the currency so as to redistribute the losses from inflation equitably between creditor and debtor;3
(3) Change the legal rule to one that systematically awards to creditors
the real value (as distinguished from the nominal value) 4 of the debt or
obligation as of the time it was entered into, at least where inflation
has significantly altered the value of the obligation. 5 Mr. Hirschberg
prefers the third alternative.6
In one way, this is a very difficult book to write a review of: Mr.
Hirschberg has a potentially very important idea for dealing with inflation and its effects, but it is presented badly. The essay is to a great
extent pioneering, and the ideas contained in it deserve careful study.
On the other hand, the writing is quite repetitive, and the economic
analysis is weak.
Two qualifications of Mr. Hirschberg's analysis should be noted before criticizing it in any detail. First, he is dealing with inflation, not
deflation; he would apparently extend his preferred solution to deflation,7 but he does not analyze the problems associated with appreciation
of the value of money. Second, his principal reference example appears
to be the German inflation following the First World War, when, as
2. E. HIRSCHBERC, THE NOMINALIsrIC PRINCIPLE 38-39, 55 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
HIRSCHBERG]. Mr. Hirschberg does not favor the "cost-of-living clause" approach, largely
on the ground that legislatures have abrogated similar clauses in the past (e.g., "gold
value" clauses), but also on the ground that if the principle of such clauses is valid, they
ought to be extended "to the whole public and not only to those who have included
value clauses in their contracts." Id. at 56.
3. Id. at 95-126; see also id. at 65-68, 70-72.
4. The term "real value" is used by economists to refer to the value of a given quantity
of goods and services, regardless of changes in the value of money. For a hypothetical
example, during an inflation of 6% per year, the Gross National Product in "real" terms
might remain steady, showing no growth and no shrinkage, while Gross National Product
in "money" terms was growing 6% per year.
5. Termed "valorism." Id. at 68-69, 73-94. For completeness, Mr. Hirschberg also treats
the possibility of a return to a metallic money standard, but this is rather easily dismissed.
Id. at 30-35, 48, 67-68.
6. Id. at 132-34.
7. Id. at 36-37, citing an Iowa case, Federal Land Bank v. Wilmarth, 218 Iowa 339,
252 N.W. 507 (1934), where the court refused to allow a decrease in the amount of a debt
proportional to the increase in the value of money since the loan was made.
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he points out, "at the last stage, one deutschmark was exchanged against
one billion former marks. . . ."I' Other inflations, of 1 to 8.4 in fourteen
years, and 1 to 6 in twelve years," he regards as at least "less severe";1"
and possibly even, in the context of his discussion, so insubstantial as
to be de minimis. Clearly, in the United States, we have not experienced
anything like the post-World War I German inflation, however serious
the current (1961 to date) American inflation seems, subjectively, to be.
For an essay on monetary theory Mr. Hirschberg's analysis is perhaps
overly restricted to the legal, as distinguished from economic, theory
of money. In fact, his economic exposition is marred somewhat by
excessive naivete. He notes several times that money is defined, functionally, as (a) a medium of exchange, and (b) a measuring unit of
value;" but he then implicitly treats only currency-primarily paper
money-as money, 12 and is thus led to treat money as though the quantity in circulation were under the absolute and simplistic control of
government. 1 He does recognize the possibility of bank creation of
money through issuance of credit based on deposits, 14 in the amount
of the reciprocal of the reserve requirement times the amount of the
deposits, 15 and also notes that other means of payment may supplement
or even supplant currency in some circumstances.' 6 However, he seems
to regard the latter as occurring only in unusual circumstances. The
fact that credit instruments may be such a large proportion of the total
money stock as to overwhelm any increase or decrease in the "issue of
currency" by government is not recognized. In the United States, for
example, total currency in circulation as of January 1, 1967, was approximately $38 billion; bank demand deposits were approximately
$136 billion; total credit outstanding was $2,129 billion, of which con8. Id. at 47; see id. at 60, 95-138 (compare his discussion of the post World War I
Polish, Hungarian, and Austrian inflations).
9. These rates of inflation occurred respectively in Israel from 1948-1962, and in France
from 1914-1926. Id. at 72.
10. Id.
11. E.g., id. at 12, 16, 45, 56.
12. Id. at 24-25, 40-41, 45. But see id. at 64 (the reference to "unrestricted banking
credit"). He refers to the acceptance of bank credit by an increase in the national debt
as a means of creating money, but his discussion is mostly in terms of "currency." Id. at
24. Even the admission of bank demand deposits to the status of "money" does not resolve
the stock versus flow problem, and its corollaries, discussed below. The admission is also
marred by a few careless statements about the nature of bank deposits. E.g., id. at 86.
13. Id. at 28-29, 45, 54, 59, 62. But see id. at 61, for an apparent contradiction.
14. Id. at 18.
15. This is the "bank multiplier," though that term is not used by Mr. Hirschberg.
For expositions see any elementary Money and Banking text, e.g., L. CHANDLER, THE EcoNOMICS OF MONEY AND BANKING 92-111 (4th ed. 1964).
16. HIRSCHBERG at 20.
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sumer credit was about $95 billion.'7 This credit figure does not even
include open purchasing credit-for example, credit cards, or thirty-day
open credit.
Money tends to be treated solely as a stock item, which makes the
whole problem much more amenable to government control.' 8 The fact
that money is also a flow variable, with a velocity of circulation that
can be as important as the stock of money in supporting shifts in the
value of money,' 9 is not dealt with. Nor is it noted that some determinants of the velocity are not easily subject to government control.
Money, for example, as a means of payment can become not merely a
measure of value but also a store of value, and the degree to which
people decide, for rational or irrational reasons, to change their holdings of idle balances, affects the velocity of circulation of money.
Furthermore, ease or tightness of credit can affect both the velocity of
circulation and the total stock. For example, if all sellers of goods decided to extend open credit for ninety days, instead of thirty days, this
would have the same effect as increasing the amount of currency in
circulation, and/or increasing its velocity; conversely, if all open creditors suddenly decided to call in their unsecured loans, and hold them,
for example, in anticipation of economic collapse-depression-and
bankruptcy of their debtors, 20 this would effectively reduce the amount
of money in circulation and/or its velocity. 2' These effects of private
action are not under the absolute control of government, except in the
17. B. PEsEK & T. SAVING, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MONEY AND BANKING 227-28, 289 (1968).
18. "If we put all the national assets of a certain State on one side of a balance and
on the other side the total amount of means of payment, the result will reflect the value
of money." HIRSCHBERG at 45.
19. The familiar economic identity (which may or may not express any of several
causal relationships, depending on who one is reading), is MV = PT, where M is the stock
of money, V is the velocity of circulation (the average number of times a given unit of money
changes hands per unit time), P is the price level, and T is the total quantity of goods
and services produced by the economy in some period of time. If this is expressed as
MV/T = P, then the price level will be affected exactly the same by a doubling of the
velocity of circulation of money as by a doubling of the stock of money. See G. ACKLEY,
MACROECONOMIC THEORY 109-19 (1961); L. CHANDLER, supra note 15; B. PESEK & T.
SAVING, supra note 17.
20. The most familiar example of this sort of change may be the "run" on a bank
that depositors lose confidence in. Large scale withdrawals of demand deposits from
commercial banks operate to "destroy" money in proportion to the bank multiplier, just
as deposits operate to create money in that same proportion.
21. The word "money" is often used by economists, now, to refer to any instrumentality
having a sufficient degree of liquidity-"moneyness"-that it effectively serves as a medium
of exchange in the economy. See, e.g., B. PESEK & T. SAVING, supra note 17, at vii. For a
more detailed analysis of the place of private credit in a monetary system, see Smith,
Is the Growth of Private Debt a Cause for Concern?, in MONETARY PROCESS AND POLICY: A
SYMPOSIUM 73 (G. Horwich, ed. 1967).
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sense that any action of any citizen can theoretically be made illegal
and brought under government control. Aside from analytical limitations resulting from a too narrow definition of money, and a failure to
deal with money as a flow variable, the book suffers somewhat from a
very limited concept of the causes of inflation. Mr. Hirschberg treats
inflation as the result, solely, of the issuance of currency 2 2-solely, that
is, as a result of the exercise of monetary policy. I know of no economist
that believes that inflation will occur simply as a result of the issuance
of currency23-although it is perhaps true that inflation will not occur
without an increase in liquid assets, or in their velocity of circulation.
Inflation may possibly be controlled through the exercise of monetary
policy, 24 although, to date, the unemployment resulting from such ef-

forts has prevented, for political reasons, the wholehearted application
of monetary policy to that end.2 5 The Keynesian analysis of the causes

of inflation is ignored. So, also, is almost all of the post (and neo) Keynesian literature on the causes of inflation, with the notable exception
of G. L. Bach's 1958 opus. 26 The influence of fiscal policy-"pumping"
the economy by lowered taxes and increased government expenditures2T

is also ignored.

Some of this can perhaps be excused, given that his reference to inflation is such an extreme one. Almost certainly a one billion to one
inflation over a period of less than ten years could not have occurred
without government complicity. But the deficiencies make the book considerably less useful in current contexts, where governments are justly
concerned about trade-offs between more moderate levels of inflation
and unemployment.
The only real problem with Mr. Hirschberg's legal analysis is that
22. HIRSCHBERG at 59.
23. This is a strong statement, and there are some who come close. See Friedman, The
Quantity Theory of Money-A Restatement, in STUDIES IN THE QUANTITY THEORY OF
MONEY 3 (M. Friedman, ed. 1956); D. PATINKIN, MONEY, INTEREST, AND PRIcEs (2d ed. 1965).
24. See Friedman, supra note 23; Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM.
ECON. REv. 1 (1968), for strong expositions and analyses of this hypothesis.
25. A reader will need no citation to document the truth of this statement in the
United States over the last few years. For a discussion of European experience with inflation, see Kervgn, Inflation and Stabilization Policies in Western Europe, in MONETARY
PROCESS AND POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM 30 (G. Horwich, ed. 1967).
26. G. BACH, INFLATION (1958). See Bronfenbrenner & Holzman, A Survey of Inflation
Theory, in I SURVEYS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 46 (1967); see also Tobin, Inflation and Unemployment, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 1 (1972), for a more recent discussion.
27. HIRscHBFRG at 60. Mr. Hirschberg notes, citing G. BACH, supra note 26, that inflation follows almost every war. The causal links are not investigated, however. Just
possibly, it would seem that such inflation is a result of the massive governmental spending
that necessarily accompanies any war, and is therefore completely predictable based on a
Keynesian macroeconomic model. See G. ACKLEY, supra note 19, at 422-26; Bronfenbrenner
& Holzman, supra note 26.
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he assumes-it seems to me a little too easily-that the intent of the
parties to any loan transaction is that the purchasing power of the
money loaned is to be returned.28 On the contrary, many lenders, especially commercial lenders, are in my experience quite conscious of the
rate of inflation, and set interest rates accordingly. This defect is again
mitigated by the fact that Mr. Hirschberg is dealing with a rate of
inflation that is very unlikely to be within the contemplation of any
parties, 2 9 and also by the fact that the major classes of creditors he is
concerned with appear to be longer term lenders, especially individual
insurance policy holders and pension plan recipients.3 0
While making his preferred solution-altering the legal rule applicable to such contractual obligations to conform to the "true" intent
of the parties to receive real value, instead of nominal money value, in
payment-applicable only to longer-term obligations such as insurance
policies and pension plans, the line of demarcation between short and
long term obligations is not made clear.3 1 Nor is the degree of inflation
necessary before the real-value principle should be called into effect
made clear. 3 2 These unclarities, on the other hand, do not detract especially from his thesis, since the book is, as noted already, to a large
extent a pioneering work, and such loose ends are therefore to be
expected.
Nor should any of the defects noted above be allowed to detract from
the importance of the suggestion-for a change in legal rules to require
real value repayment of many obligations3 3-as a means of dealing with
28. This is asserted several times, e.g., HIRSCHBERG at 48, 57-58.
The aim of the parties to a bargain is not to acquire a nominal sum of units of
currency but to acquire purchasing power included in monetary units when the
binding contract between the parties was made. The writers writing on the problems
of monetary law are nearly unanimous, that the aim of the parties is to acquire
purchasing power.
Id. at 58. With respect to this last sentence, one is constrained to ask: (1) What writers?
Felix Eckstein is the only one to whom this view is explicitly attributed, but he is cited
on page 48, not page 58. The book occasionally suffers from a lack of this sort of documentation. (2) Are writers on monetary law qualified to testify? Are they not, probably,
speculating on the basis of introspection and conversations with a few friends and
neighbors (just as I am, in the next sentence in the text)? If they are speculating, is there
any way of obtaining firm data?
29. Id. at 60.
30. Id. at 69-70.
31. This problem is, indeed, left open for further development. Id. at 94.
32. E.g., id. at 42, 72, 97.
33. It may increase the acceptability of this suggestion, assuming it is decided that the
problem is an important one, and that secondary effects of the solution will be tolerable,
negligible, or beneficial, to point out that the proposed method of making the change-a
reinterpretation of what the parties to a contract or other legal transaction intended relative to a problem they did not deal with, and probably never even thought of when they
entered into the transaction-is a reasonably conventional way of making similar changes
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many of the problems of inflation. Obligations to pay pensions, for
example, are currently almost universally on a nominal basis, making
retired people among the prime sufferers from inflation; interpreting
pension obligations as being on a real value basis would protect retirees
4
from inflation.3
The idea should also be given thorough consideration by economists
as a possible means of control of inflation. In the United States the
change in the legal rules would probably have to be accomplished by
the actions of fifty state legislatures (fifty-three counting the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam), and one could foresee some horrendous conflict-of-laws problems arising during the process of change;
but these things would not prevent the adoption of a real-value-ofobligations rule if the public interest would be served thereby.
If everyone's obligations were tied to the real value contracted for
at the time the obligation was undertaken, would this have the effect
of dampening borrowing, and hence investment, to the point where
unemployment might increase unacceptably (for example, would it
cause a recession or depression); would it tend to dampen inflation
without increasing unemployment; or would it tend to drive prices up
faster as producers sought to repay larger numbers of depreciated
dollars when debts came due? I do not know, although, I suspect it
would be more likely to dampen inflation than to cause or aggravate it.
Mr. Hirschberg's idea, as a means of dealing with the effects of inflation and possibly with inflation itself, is entirely novel. It has been
dealt with in a limited way in the legal literature as a means of dealing
with the effects of inflation, 5 but has received no treatment at all in
in the common law. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 2 (1955) (making words of inheritance
no longer necessary to pass a fee simple title); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.14 (1950) (providing for a definite failure of issue construction of the words "die without issue"). The
only real difference between these examples and Mr. Hirschberg's proposal is that
there may be significant side effects from his proposal. The manner of making the change
is completely traditional, and is the same in all three cases.
34. The only question I would have, here, is whether such a change, especially if
made retroactive to protect current retirees, would bankrupt any substantial number of
pension plans. Unfortunately, the greater the rate of inflation, and the longer the term of
the obligation, the more likely such bankruptcy would be. This latter statement would be
true even if the change were made applicable only to the future, if the rate of inflation
were not wholly predictable. It is perhaps worth noting that many people attempt to
hedge against inflation, now, by investing part of their retirement savings in stocks, or
by attempting to save more. The first is very (often unduly) risky; the latter is, for most
people, impossible. The difficulty of funding the real-value-of-obligations proposal may
well be much more difficult than Mr. Hirschberg admits. He dismisses it rather too easily.
HIRSCHBERG at 81-82.
35. E.g., Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924, 33
MICH. L. R~v. 171 (1935); Dawson & Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts:
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economic literature. Considering the intractability of inflation to other
tools that have been utilized in the United States, and the apparent
inability to escape the unemployment-inflation dilemma3 6 it should
be thoroughly studied.
Robert Broughton*
United States, 1861-1879, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 706, 852 (1935); see also Dawson & Coultrap,
Contracting by Reference to Price Indices, 33 MICH. L. REv. 685 (1935).
36. "Macroeconomic policies, monetary and fiscal, are incapable of realizing society's
unemployment and inflation goals simultaneously. This dismal fact has long stimulated
a search for third instruments to do the job ..
" Tobin, supra note 26, at 17.
* Chairman of the Allegheny County Air Pollution Variance Board; Professor of Law,
Duquesne University Law School.
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